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University of Alberta

A Reformulated Critique of Political Economy As Critique of Ideology

By

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled A Reformulated Critique of Political Economy as Critique of Ideology submitted by Sohrab Shiravand in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Abstract

In the last few decades, the concept of ideology has become the object of analysis in social theory. The analysis of ideology and its modes of operation and reproduction has taken two main forms ,i.e.,positive conception of ideology and critical conception of ideology. In examining the distinction between these two conceptions of ideology, this thesis argues that the positive conception of ideology is heavily influenced by functionalism and/or structural-functionalism. The consequences of this influence are a failure to appreciate social contradictions and an inability to specify the precise nature of the relationship between the various spheres of production within a historically specific form of social life. Also, this thesis argues that a critical conception of ideology adequate to the contemporary social historical world, which is highly complex, uneven, socially contradictory and temporally non-synchronous, must draw on Marx's critical conception of ideology, and his critique of political economy as critique of ideology. This means that Marx broke with the positive tradition that conceptualized ideology as conceptual system, critically locating it in the political economy, in social-historical practices which sustains the exploitative social relations and relations of domination. This thesis argues that political economy must be understood as ideology, which is equal to domination. Thus, a reformulated critical conception of ideology is intimately connected to the critique of political economy as critique of ideology.

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I. Introduction

Ideology is one of the most problematic and perplexing objects of investigation within social theory in general and Marxist theory in particular. The analysis of ideology and its modes of operation and reproduction usually have been confined to analysis of political structures and practices. Consequently, the broad questions of everyday life and the particular historical forms and processes from which the most subtle forms of ideology arise have been overlooked. The most complicated forms of ideology are found in the reproduction of social order, in the forms in which everyday life is organized. My point of departure here, then, is with a close examination of the daily reproduction of the means of subsistence, the process of capitalist reproduction, and the reification inherent in commodity fetishism, or of what Marx calls, “the religion of everyday life”. This examination will enable us to reformulate a critical conception of ideology that will help to explain the generation and reproduction of ideology, and thus help overcome ideologies in the contemporary world.

I am concerned then, with Marx’s critical conception of ideology, and , in particular, with his critique of political economy as critique of ideology. This thesis presents and intervenes in debates concerning the study of ideology and investigates the historicity of the theory of value, the value-form of commodity, the money form, the god among commodities, and the general form of wealth, the object of Marx’s critical theory. My goal is to construct a reformulated critique of political economy as a critique of ideology, and to explore the ways that “ideology”, as the abstract expression of structured social relations, establishes, sustains, and reproduces relations of domination. I pose the problem of ideology in a specific way: if domination is intrinsic to ideology, then it must

be explained in relation to the exploitative structured social relations in class societies and to the historically specific social forms of wealth and production of wealth in capitalist society. Thus, an explanation of ideology must be intimately connected with the question of critique or Marx's critical theory.

According to Marx, critical social science must be characterized as the critique of political economy. For Marx, critique is a particular form of analysis, an examination that not only reveals contradictions but also explains them and comprehends their genesis and necessity. In other words, the object of Marx's critique is the specific social forms of wealth and the social and historical conditions which gave rise to them; Marx's critical theory is not a Hegelian partial critique, rather it is a revolutionary critique, a total critique which tends to contribute to practice by explaining the historically grounded social contradictions (the actual contradictions), and the social forms which are at work in the production of ideology. In this way, it contributes to opening up the possibilities for overcoming ideology in practice. In this sense, the reading and the type of reconstruction and exegesis that this thesis presents, shifts the terms of theoretical problems as they have been articulated in "Western" Marxism since its inception, and dispels misconceptions concerning Marx's object of investigation, namely, political economy, or bourgeois ideology. Thus, it is necessary to examine Marx's writings to outline a non-reductionist conception of ideology informed by critique or critical theory.

My argument, in brief, is that "ideology" refers to an ensemble of embodied (objectified) abstractions which sustain and reproduce relations of domination. Moreover, ideology is interconnected with social contradictions (class struggle), and with the social relations of production in class societies. At the same time, ideology enjoys a certain or

partial autonomy vis-à-vis the social relations of production in a historically specific mode of production of material life. In this regard, ideology is crystallized and embodied in the ideological apparatuses that constantly address or interpellate every individual.

“Critique” understood in this way, helps clarify what might be misconceived about a prevailing understanding of ideology as “positive” or neutral. One version of this positive approach to ideology draws on a strand in Marx’s writings, in particular, the base/superstructure metaphor articulated in, the 1859 Preface to The Critique of Political Economy (Marx,1970). In this model, ideology is an element of the so-called “superstructure”, and it is reduced to the “epiphenomena”, to the echo, to the reflex, and to the appendage of the so-called “real foundation,” that is, the “base” (“the economic base”). In this model, the base determines the superstructure and the latter reacts to or interacts with the former. This model emerged out of the materialism of the eighteenth-century, the reflection theory of knowledge, and the theory of factors (two-way or reciprocal interactions, and multiple causation). According to this model, ideology is identified with false consciousness and as the unreal vis-à-vis the real or true consciousness. Consequently, ideology is treated, as a conceptual system, a synonym for belief systems, or “world-view”.

In another version of the positive conception of ideology, ideology is regarded as the imaginary which functions as “social cement”. This positive conception of ideology is heavily influenced by the functionalism and or the structural-functionalism that fails to appreciate the social contradictions, the class struggles inscribed in the constitutions of the class societies and in the exploitative structured social relations, and is unable to specify the historically precise nature of the relationships between the moments, or parts,

of praxis. As I will argue in this thesis, the positive conception of ideology has been the prevailing view at the Second and Third International as well as within the Marxist tradition and social theory in general.

At the same time that this thesis intervenes into epistemological queries, it also broadens Marx's critical conception of ideology by suggesting that ideology as embodied (objectified) and congealed abstractions, not only sustains and reproduces class domination but also maintains other types and forms of domination such as colonialism, sexism, and racism among others. As I will show, a historically determinate interconnection exists between non-class forms of domination and class domination rooted in the social and sexual division of labor, and the way in which the social constitution of the forms of reproduction is organized. In other words, non-'class' forms of domination are over-determined by class contradiction, and by abstract labor, forms of money, forms of value, forms of capital, forms of states, etc. Thus, the reconstruction that this paper presents not only emphasizes Marx's notion of critique, but also exposes the very limits of critical theory. Under the influence of the dominant ideologies and through ideological apparatuses, "critical theory" has itself become partly ideological. Thus, although Marx was the founder of revolutionary critical theory and brought into existence the critical conception of ideology, and opposed class exploitation, he was not immune to the racial sexist discourses and practices of the Victorian era. In short, he was constrained by his time.

One way of examining the limits of critical theory is to argue that it came into existence in the context of the uneven global temporality and spatiality, the uneven global class relations and social contradictions, the uneven global social division of labor, the

uneven layering of times, or what Ernest Bloch calls “the non-synchronicity of times”, and within a multi-layered social reality, where capitalist, colonialist, and racist discourses and discourses of sexuality, genocide, and ecocide coincide. In the highly complex and stratified social-historical world, critical theory was opposed to class exploitation, yet it was not entirely immune from the concept of synchrony, from the essentialist cultural metaphysics, from evolutionism, from economic reductionism, from bourgeois discourses of morality and sexuality, from racial discourses, and from instrumentalist discourses of nature, among others, prevalent in the European class societies in the nineteenth century. The result of this is that Marx’s theory was simultaneously critical and ideological: the ideological element stood in sharp contrast to the critical theory of society, and to the type of historical materialism that Marx himself created and advanced. Thus, the ideological dimension of Marx’s theory lent itself to the Marxism-Leninism in Soviet-type societies, to the Social Democracy in the Western capitalist societies, to the positive Marxism in the world of academia, and on the international level.

There are several important consequences which emerge from my analysis. The first is that historical materialism is only valid if it is viewed as theory of praxis. This reading runs directly counter to evolutionistic and teleological analysis of history on the basis of the succession of the modes of production. In other words, it rejects the philosophy of history, and particularly, the Hegelian philosophy of history which some Marxists still hold to be a general historico-philosophical theory, a super-historical master-key which unlocks all doors. A second consequence of my revision is to affirm the multi-layered global social reality within which, as Bloch (cited in Aronowitz,1981)

argues, “not all People exist in the same Now”. Within “a rich totality of many determinations and relations” (Marx, 1973, p.101), or around what Althusser called overdetermination of the social contradictions in a global asymmetrical social relations, different modes of production of material life exist in different nows. Indeed, the global uneven social division of labor, the multi-layered social reality, the temporal and spatial non-synchronicity, has intensified the pre-existing social contradictions and conflicts. These social historical conditions invoke working class and the other subaltern (such as the unemployed, the landless peasants, the youth among others) who live in different nows, to oppose the dominant ideologies and the ideological apparatuses through which the relations of domination are reproduced and enforced. Thus, a reformulated critique of ideology helps explain the question that Marx posed: why do human relations take the form of capital? Critique highlights the mobilizing power of ideology, the basis of its generation and reproduction as well as the revival, resurrection, re-activation, and re-animation of older traditions and ideologies. For instance, it helps explain the re-activation of Islamic ideology in a new form in Iran, which interacts, competes, overlaps, and clashes with the other ideologies, in particular, the ideology of commodity fetishism in this particular social-historical contexts of global class relations. Equally important is that critical theory, against the dualism prevalent in social theory, emphasizes on the internal relationship between social relations (structures) and struggle (Bonefeld and Holloway, 1995) and acknowledges that the relations of domination/struggle exist through non-synchronicity of times, asymmetrical relations, and within the frameworks of the world market and system of states in an entangled social-historical world.

In what follows I will briefly analyze the ideology of commodity fetishism, then I will reformulate a critical conception of ideology by engaging with “Western” Marxist conceptualization of ideology, and its modes of operation. The last section of this thesis provides elaborations on the situation of ideology within a mode of production of material life (social formation).

II. Commodity Fetishism

Marx holds the view, in his analysis of commodity fetishism in Capital (Marx, 1990 and 1991) that domination is intrinsic to the form of capitalist production. Ideology in general, and particular forms of ideology are generated and produced (or to put it in Poulantzasian term, “secreted”) out of the social relations of production, by the social division of labor, and they are directly embodied in the state power, the state apparatuses and the practices of power (Poulantzas, 1978, p.67). The dominant ideology of the capitalist mode of production is the ideology of commodity fetishism, since fetishism is an ingredient in the form of commodity production. It is part of exploitative social relations, inseparable from the production of commodities and becomes generalized in other apparatuses (Lichtman, 1975, p.59). Under a capitalist mode of production, without the mediation of ideology, the relations between real living individuals have converted into the social relations between things:

[T]he commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour within which it appears ... is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes here for them the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to find an analogy we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is in the world of, commodities with the products of man's hands. I call this the fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labour as soon as they are produced as commodities, and is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities (Marx, 1990, p.165).

Thus, it follows that to the producers, “the social relations between their private labours appear as they are, i.e. they do not appear as direct social relations between persons in their work, but rather as material [dinglich] relations between persons and social relations between things” (ibid, p.166).

Commentaries on this passage sheds some light on Marx's conception of

ideology, since with the emergence of the commodity production, the commodity fetishism, i.e., value, itself has become a medium of sustaining, reinforcing and reproducing the relations of domination. Both value and ideology are identical in structure (characteristics) and modes of operation, and embody reification which denies the specificity and historicity of a determinate form of social life; they naturalize the existing social-historical world, the presence, and reify the capitalist social relations of production. Fetishism is constitutive of the capitalist mode of production, the world of commodities; it is attached to the products of labor, and inseparable from commodity relations. Also, it is important to note that in the cited passage appearance is not illusion; it is a part, an aspect of social reality. Appearance is real, and in a way, appearance and reality (essence) coincide. Although Marx highlights the distinction between appearance and reality, nevertheless, he recognizes that appearance and reality are in some sense the same. Appearance, after all, is part of reality (Russel, 1979, p.193). In this regard, Bertell Ollman argues that "essence includes appearance but transcends it in every direction in which what is apparent acquires its importance" (ibid and Ollman, 1980, p.63). This implies that appearance has actual existence. In short, commodities are social creations, produced in an historically specific mode of production which is constituted by the structured social relations (Lichtman, 1975 , p.68). Thus, commodity fetishism reifies and naturalizes, these relations. Present them as immutable conditions of existence and the exploitative relations which condition them as immutable and unalterable law of nature.

The point, however, is that political economy (bourgeois economics) is nothing but bourgeois ideology, since the discursive order of bourgeois ideology is nothing but

the expression of commodity fetishism. The categories of bourgeois economics, according to Marx, consist precisely of the forms of objectified abstract relation such as value (Valamanesh, 1988, p.273):

They are forms of thought which are socially valid, and therefore objective, for the relations of production belonging to this historically determined mode of social production, i.e. commodity production. The whole mystery of commodities, all the magic and necromancy that surrounds the products of labour on the basis of commodity production, vanishes therefore as soon as we come to other forms of production (Marx, 1990, p.169).

So political economy, Marx argues, has analyzed value and its magnitude incompletely and has excavated the content concealed within these forms, but it has never discovered why this content has taken that particular form; in other words, political economy has never asked the question why labor is expressed in value (ibid, pp.173-4). It has failed, in terms of the analysis of commodities and their value, to uncover the form of value which turns value into exchange-value due to the fact that political economist such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo treated the form of value as something indifferent, external to the nature of the commodity itself. Thus, political economy treats the value-form of the product of labor, the most abstract and universal form of the bourgeois mode of production, which is a historically determinate social production, as the eternal and natural form of social production. Consequently, it neglects and conceals the specificity of the value-form, and its further development, such as the money-form, etc (ibid, p.174), in the similar vein as the “Fathers of the Church treated pre-Christian religions” (ibid, p.175).

For Marx, under the influence of commodity fetishism, the forms “which stamp products as commodities”, already possess “the fixed quality of natural forms of social

life”, and assert themselves like law of nature, immutable in the eyes of the agents of production and real individuals (ibid, p.168). Thus, because domination (relations of domination) is intrinsic to ideology and its constitution, ideology serves as the most effective medium for retention (sustenance) and reproduction of relations of domination. The latter crucial characteristic (nature) of ideology, actually and generally operates via other traits and mode of operations of ideology, that is, reification, the prevention (inhibition) of human beings from recognition (consciousness) of their real conditions of life and existence, the concealment of contradictions, and the universalization of sectional interests, among others (Valamanesh, 1988, p.257).

Lukacs and Althusser’s views concerning two characteristics of ideology, namely, reification and prevention of human beings from consciousness respectively, are particularly revealing (although they are not without problems), and it is important to dwell on their theories in some respects. Lukacs’ point of departure in History and Class Consciousness is the idea that commodity fetishism is a specific problem of our age, that is to say, the age of modern capitalism (Lukacs, 1971, p.84), which permeates every aspect of social life. Having discussed Marx’s distinction between preceding forms of society and capitalism, and the ways in which commodity as the universal structuring principle, penetrating society in all its aspects and remolds it in its own image (ibid, pp.84-5), Lukacs proceeds to show that:

Just as the capitalist system continuously produces and reproduces itself economically on higher and higher levels, the structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more fatefully and more definitively into the consciousness of man (ibid, p.93).

He discusses his argument further by asserting that:

Just as the economic theory of capitalism remains stuck fast in its self-created immediacy, the same thing happens to bourgeois attempts to comprehend the ideological phenomenon of reification. Even thinkers who have no desire to deny or obscure its existence and who are more or less clear in their own minds about its humanly destructive consequences remain on the surface and make no attempt to advance beyond its objectively most derivative forms, the forms furthest from the real life-process of capitalism, i.e. the most external and vacuous forms, to the basic phenomenon of reification itself (ibid, p.94).

For the limitation of space, I will confine myself to few remarks on Lukacs' conceptualization of reification. I want to suggest that his argument is untenable when he takes the analysis of reification a step further by suggesting that "[I]t stamps its imprint upon the whole consciousness of man; his qualities and abilities are no longer an organic part of his personality, they are things which he can 'own' or 'dispose of' like the various objects of the external world" (ibid, p.100).

Specifically, the problem with Lukacs' argument is that this notion of total reification underestimates class struggle, the social contradictions, and praxis which allow the real living individuals with flesh and blood, the historically, specific struggling, oppressed class, what Walter Benjamin (1989) calls "the depository of historical knowledge", to challenge, to resist, and even to transform the existing relations of domination. The idea of total reification which Lukacs shares with Weber (total rationalization), Simmel, and Marcuse among others, disregards the social historical context insofar as it overlooks the ways that structured social relations take diverse forms within a complex heterogeneous differentiated, stratified, hierarchical, decentered, uneven, contradictory, and never-ending totality (Swingewood, 1977, pp.109-10; Burnham, 1995, p.96). Social contradictions, the constantly changing forms of social/historical practices in particular circumstances, open up the opportunities for the living individuals and struggling oppressed class to adopt a critical stance and relation to

the ideological forms, to the relations of domination. Nonetheless, reification, is intrinsic to commodity fetishism which treats the production of commodities as a natural law, as inalterable, as immutable; it contributes to the thingification of social forms, to the eternalization of capitalist form of production of a particular historical reality as if it were from immemorial time (Marx, 1991, p.969; Lichtman, 1975, p.68).

Ideology inhibits real living individuals from grasping their real conditions of existence; ideology like insulation, is a hindrance to human beings' ability to grasp consciousness and recognize the "real" conditions of existence. This characteristic of ideology was spelled out by Althusser when he asserted that "[I]f history is difficult to explain scientifically, it is because between real history and men there is always a screen, a separation: a class ideology of history ..." (Althusser, 1976, pp.55-6). For Althusser and Poulantzas, ideology is not false consciousness and has nothing to do with consciousness. Rather it is a specific instance of a mode of production and mode of production of material life, secreted by the social division of labor and embodied in the state apparatuses (Poulantzas, 1973, p.208 and 1978, p.66; Althusser, 1969, pp.232-5). According to Poulantzas:

We have ended by considering that ideologies only exists in ideas, customs, or morals without seeing that ideology can be embodied in the strong sense, in institutions: institutions which then, by the process of institutionalization, belong to the state whilst depending critically on the ideological level (Poulantzas, 1976, pp.250-1).

He goes on, following Althusser, to include a series of institutions as parts of capitalist states such as church, political parties, the schools, the mass media, and the family, what Althusser called "ideological state apparatuses". Although the Althusser-Poulantzas thesis is insightful, it is an object of dispute. Empirically and historically it is

alsoundtenable since the institutions of family form, or the media, for instances, are not necessarily part of state apparatuses. Goran Therborn claims that Althusser rethought his position on the “ideological state apparatuses” and argued only for the intrinsic link between ‘the’ state, or more accurately, capitalist states (because there is no state in singularity, rather state exists only in the form of multiplicity of states (Holloway, 1995, p.122) and ideological apparatuses (Therborn, 1988, p.85). Although both Althusser and Poulantzas give due place to ideology and revive the Marxist theory of ideology, their theory at times converges with the functionalist, in particular, Parsonian sociology that focuses on common culture, a shared set of belief, values, and norms through the mechanism of socialization. Also, the Frankfurt School theorists (Horkheimer and Adorno) share a common view with the functionalist analysis of ideology by emphasizing the internalization of norms through the culture industry. For instance, Althusser asserts that “ideology (as a system of mass representations) is indispensable in any society if men are to be formed, transformed, and equipped to respond to the demands of their conditions of existence” (Althusser, 1969, p.235). Poulantzas quotes Gramsci with affirmation, that ideology serves as the “cement” of a society (Poulantzas, 1973, p.201), and thus makes an argument that is somewhat functionalist. For Marx, if there is at all such thing as the systemic integration (or the social integration of classes, people, or individual), it is achieved in and through the “dull compulsion of economic relations”, the day-to-day reproduction of the means of subsistence, and the social forms in which everyday life is organized. Although I question Althusser, Poulantzas, and the Frankfurt theorists’ treatment of the modes of operation of ideology, I see the functionalist treatment as symptomatic of some other fundamental deficiency and problem which

attends their conceptualization of ideology. In other words, their weaknesses is not merely due to having a functionalist understanding of ideology. Rather it results from not seeing domination or relations of domination as the nature of ideology. From Althusser's stand point (perspective), ideology, therefore, is indispensable in any society, even in a free society. In this regard, needless to say, such a conception of ideology results in severing ideology from the exploitative social relations of production, from labor relations and processes, and from the relations of class domination that embrace and surrounds it under class societies. In short, it eternalizes ideology.

III. The Concept of Ideology

The term “ideology” appeared in France at the end of the eighteenth century (Cox, 1969, p.8; Lichtheim, 1967, p.4). Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) was one of the ideologues, liberal intellectuals, who founded the Institut de France, and helped to promote Napoleon Bonaparte’s accession to political power. He employed the concept of ideology in 1796 (Cox, 1969, p.15). In Elements of Ideology Tracy presents his ‘science of ideas’, basing himself on the authority of Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke, among others. On Tracy’s view, Hobbes was the founder of ideology:

That political principles are derived from knowledge of the motions of the mind; and knowledge of the motions of the mind from the study of sensations and ideas. For this sentence alone, Hobbes should be considered as the founder of ideology, and the renovator of the moral sciences (Quoted in Cox, 1969, p.15).

For Destutt de Tracy, the study of ideology is part of zoology in the sense that human psychology must be explained in biological terms couched within naturalism. Although Napoleon was influenced by the thinkers of the Institute, nevertheless, he distrusted them for their link with the idea of republicanism, moderate liberalism, and freedom of thought and expression (Lichtheim, 1967, pp.4-5). After the defeat in Russia in 1812, Napoleon attacked ideologues for undermining the political power in a statement:

It is to ideology, that obscure metaphysics, which searching after first causes, wishes to found upon them the legislation of nations of adapting the laws to the knowledge of the human heart and to the lessons of history, that we are to attribute all the calamities that our beloved France has experienced (Quoted in Cox, 1969, p.14).

The reaction of Napoleon against ideologues and the use of the term ideology in the political sphere, in particular, by the emperor complicated the conception of ideology.

Bacon's criticism of the idols became prejudice, contrary to reason, in the works of Condillac, Holbach, and Helvetius (Lichtheim, 1969, pp.8-9), but it is also seen negatively as the erroneous ideas. The meaning of the term ideology has gradually shifted from the science of ideas to ideas themselves that is the erroneous body of ideas: the concept also shifted from positive conception to the negative conception (Thompson, 1990, p.32).

1. Concept of Ideology in Marx

Marx's conception of ideology differs fundamentally from that of his eighteenth-century predecessors. Marx's analysis of ideology plays an important part in the history of the term ideology itself. Indeed, he provided insights into the nature of ideology which still inform any serious discussion of the concept. However, the analysis of ideology, "its" nature and modes of operation, and "its" reproduction, in particular, in everyday life, is still one of the most fundamental problem for Marxists. I turn first to Marx in order to trace the emergence of the critical conception of ideology. I will then attempt to examine the degree to which Marx's critical conception of ideology has influenced other theorists within and outside Marxism. In this way, this thesis leads to a reformulated critical conception of ideology by both drawing on and critically engaging with Marx, Marxists, and other critical theorists. This will allow me to draw some conclusions about the distinguishing trait, the modes of operation, and material determination of ideology on the one hand, and its relation to other moments of the particular praxis on the other. The critical conception of ideology which I develop is referred to as an ensemble of

embodied and objectified abstractions, while divorced from their genesis, that is, determinate social and historical practices, they determine social relations. This reformulation broadens Marx's critical conception of ideology to include non-class forms of domination, such as racism, sexism, and colonialism, among others.

Although Marx's remarks on ideology are scattered and fragmented, he always linked the concept of ideology to the phenomenon of domination, in particular class domination. Thus, this paper focuses on elaborating on one particular strand of Marx's conception of ideology which I consider to be worth building on, and problematizes and deconstructs other strands which I am arguing are therefore ideological, and thus in need of critique. It is important to bear in mind that the critical concept of ideology was integral to the Marx's theory. In The German Ideology, Marx presented a theoretical framework which linked the analysis of the ideology to the question of critique of domination:

[F]or each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to present its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and present them as the only rational, universally valid ones. The class making a revolution comes forward from the very start, if only because it is opposed to a class, not as a class but as the representative of the whole of society, as the whole mass of society confronting the one ruling class (Marx and Engels 1976, pp.68-9).

Although the term ideology is not used by Marx in this passage, he implicitly asserts that ideology sustains and reproduces class domination. It follows that ideology, as part of social historical practices (reality) cloaks the sectional interests (of ruling class) and serves the ruling class by universalizing the latter. Thus, bourgeois ideology as dominant discourse denies the divided individuals in classes and disguises class contradictions and screens social contradictions between general interests and private

ones (ibid, p.52) through the system of the ideological apparatuses which are part of the organization of power in society; the apparatuses that are affected by and bound up intrinsically to states (Therborn, 1988, p.85).

In a very important passage in The Eighteenth Brumaire, Marx (1968) paid sufficient attention to move beyond base/superstructure metaphor in which ideology, philosophy, and sciences, among others, reduced to the epiphenomena, to the reflexes ('reflections'), to the echoes, to the 'superstructure', to the external objects couched in the mechanical terms derived from the standpoint of the eighteenth-century materialism. Marx wrote :

Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time-honoured disguise and this borrowed language (Marx, 1968, p.15).

To understand the history of the Second French Republic and to analyze the particular historical conjuncture, Marx brilliantly introduces the manner in which the 'ensemble' of the congealed objectified, and configured abstractions, that is ideology, 'the tradition of all dead generations', the 'costumes', 'names', 'battle cries', carnivalesque, the congealed past as dead labor (Lichtman, 1975, p.55), live on and survive the historically specific forms of the social life which gave birth to them. In this way, he points out how ideology comes to play an active role in the time of social revolution, in the time of transformation by the struggling class, by the real living

individuals making histories by creating the past, by drawing its poetry from the past by the new social practices, and by recollecting the past world history in the new social historical conjuncture.

This passage is not couched in the dichotomy between the social process and the 'economic' process, nor in the mechanical terms of multiple causation, and the reciprocal and mutual interaction between the different 'factors' within a given context nor in the base/superstructure scheme. Marx here presents a non-reductionist conception of ideology which at root is based on the theory of praxis as self-creating, self-realizing, self-extending activities which informs his critical theory. In the preface to The Eighteenth Brumaire (1968), where he spoke against Victor Hugo and Proudhon, Marx raises the crucial point that "class struggle in France created circumstances and relationships that made it possible for a grotesque mediocrity to play a hero's part" (ibid, p.8).

Real living individuals make history under the specific economic, political, and symbolic practices. History is neither an independent entity nor a force outside the specific forms of the structured social relations (Swingewood, 1977, p.57). It is worth stressing that Marx had protested in advance against transcendental philosophy, against a historical and idealist conception of totality, against those who personify history into an independent entity. For instance, in The Holy Family he writes that "[h]istory, like truth, becomes a person apart, a metaphysical subject, of which the real individuals are merely the bearers" (Quoted in Lichtheim, 1969, p.14). Thus, class struggle, as a moment ('instance') of praxis, is history since it is endemic, though, in multiforms, to the specific,

concrete class societies (Johnson, 1982, p.47; Swingwood, 1977, p.111). Johnson aptly notes that class struggle does not exist independently of history to then act on it: it is history (ibid).

This quote from the 18th Brumaire also alerts us to the idea that, writing to Engels, Marx asserts that ideology is not conceptualized either as reflection or as a passive reflection of economic practices. In letters to Joseph Bloch (1890), to Franz Mehring (1893) and Heinz Starkenburg (1894) (Selsam et al, 1983, pp.72-9) Engels modified the rigid base/superstructure metaphor and advocated two-way interactions and multiple causation in analyzing the relation between ideology and other elements of praxis. However, he failed to illuminate the precise nature of the relationship between ideology and other moments of praxis, and thereby, “eliminated the dialectics completely” (Swingewood, 1977, p.62).

The theory of factors or multiple causation, which Engels sometimes endorses, is based on the interplay (interaction and reaction) between objects (factors) as logically independent of each other. Once they are understood as relating to each other haphazardly and externally like positivistic approach, however, the historicity, the specificity, the interconnection of the complex forms of practices, and the social character of Marx’s notion of contradiction are lost. Marx’s critical theory grasps interconnection and interrelations (articulation) within phenomena as well as the specific forms that they take historically (grounded in time and space), without overlooking the partial autonomy of multi-various practices in a differentiated, hierarchical, and contradictory form of social life such as symbolic forms, state forms, etc.

In Marx's writings, domination is intrinsic to ideology and this can be shown by explicating his observations and some of his arguments in some passages in Capital, a book whose subtitle reads as follows: "A Critique of Political Economy".

A careful analysis of Capital reveals the manner in which the objectified and abstract (alienated) labor, i.e., value has the character and nature like ideology. Value like ideology embodies reification which naturalizes a historically specific form of social life. That is, under capitalist relations of production value appears as transhistorical, immutable, eternal, etc. In his discussion of commodity fetishism, Marx makes it clear that political economy is ideology, thereby, like every ideology, it acts as insulation between human beings and their real conditions of existence, preventing them from fully understanding the latter. This, however, does not mean that ideology is "false consciousness"; the conception of ideology as "false consciousness" is rooted in the eighteenth-century rationalist tradition, the tradition that separates ideology from the structured social relations from the material conditions of existence, from determinate social historical practices and social conditions, from historically specific form of social life. According to rationalists, because cognition gives access to universal truths not present in immediate experience, establishing "true" consciousness enables individuals to grasp their role as rational beings (Lichtheim, 1967, pp.18-19). As a result, the task of critical thought is understood to be to transform the alienated mental activity to reform consciousness which enables the eradication of ignorance or lack of awareness about the world or reality so that individuals become aware of their own consciousness (ibid). The important point here is that the characterization of ideology as false consciousness is problematic. Suggesting that all ruling ideas are ideological conceals social

contradictions and the sectional interests of the ruling class. For instance, not all artistic, scientific, literary, or theoretical works are ideological. Also, it seems to me that the conceptualization of ideology as false consciousness is based on the assumption that consciousness or knowledge is the mirror reflex, echo, copy, reflection, and images of real thing, of reality. In other words, this conceptualization is rooted in the base/superstructure metaphor, in which economy is the base and primary and the so-called “superstructure” including ideology, is passive, epiphenomena which reflect the former.

In his interpretation of Marx, Habermas argues that “[i]deology critique by itself can at most shake the legitimacy of the orders ... The critique of false consciousness is not identical with the overthrow of institutions that are supported by this consciousness- even if Marx does bring together these two moments in his concept of “critical-practical activity”” (Habermas , 1982, p.230). Against Habermas’ interpretation of ideology as “false consciousness” which he wrongly ascribes to Marx, few objections can be raised since his presentation differs from Marx’s critical conception of ideology in some respects. First, Habermas’ argument that Marx defined ideology as false consciousness is untenable. The closest one can come to is in the following passage that was written, not by Marx, but rather by Engels:

Ideology is a process accomplished by the so-called thinker consciously, indeed, but with a false consciousness (Selsam et al, 1983, p.72).

Second, as Althusser suggested, ideology is neither a distorted representation of reality (Hirst, 1979, p.23) nor is it ideal or spiritual (ibid, p.27) since Marx rejects the dualistic opposition between matter (body) and ideas (mind or consciousness). Ideologies are real

and they are constitutive of, and inscribed within social-historical practices. Third, following this line of thought, one may abandon the conception of ideology as conceptual system (Poulantzas, 1973, p.208), i.e., the consciousness (recognition) of living individuals (“agents”) of something (social relations). Fourth, the word false is ambiguous, and there are many interpretations of falsity. False can mean “untrue” as well as it can mean “unreal” (Bagleton, 1991, p.22). Paul Hirst, in On Law and Ideology (1979) argues that “Ideology is not illusory ...; it is not illusion, it is not falsity, because how can something which has effects be false? It may derive from forms of the imaginary but it is not false” (Hirst, 1979, p.38). Last but not least, Callinicos argues that ideological belief can be, like all beliefs either true or false, and the epistemological notion of ideology as false consciousness originated from Enlightenment critique of religious prejudiced and ignorance that must ultimately be discarded (Callinicos, 1987, p.148). Thus, if ideology is not false, according to Callinicos, then it must not be treated as consciousness either (Callinicos, 1983, p.135).

In a celebrated quotation in Capital III, Marx observes that:

The specific economic form in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of the direct producers determines the relationship of domination and servitude, as this grows directly out of production itself and reacts back on it in turn as a determinant. On this is based the entire configuration of the economic community arising from the actual relations of production, and hence also its specific political form. It is in each case the direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of production to the immediate producers—a relationship whose particular form naturally corresponds always to a certain level of development of the type and manner of labour, and hence to its social productive power—in which we find the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice, and hence also the political form of the relationship of sovereignty in each case (Marx, 1991, p.127).

Marx goes on to suggest that the specific economic form displays endless variations and gradations in its appearance due to the infinite empirical and historical circumstances and

influences such as natural conditions, racial relations, external impetuses among others. However, these forms can only be grasped and explained where speculation and mystification end, and actual empirical study of the given conditions, brings out empirically the connection of the social and political structure with production (ibid, pp.927-8; Marx, 1976, pp.41-3). This view of the empirical studies of the inner connection of the different moments of the praxis, it must be emphasized, remained with Marx throughout his life. It thus becomes clear that for Marx domination is intrinsic to ideology, which in turn is constitutive of social relation of the social reality, the exploitative social relation in which unpaid surplus labor extracted. In these exploitative social relations lies “the innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social edifice”. Likewise also, one finds the existence of the concrete forms of ideology, as the basic elements (moments), as the “ingredient” and constitutive of social relations of human beings within the exploitative mode of production in class societies (Lichtman, 1975, p.56). So, in considering the cited passage from Marx, one must bear in mind that the historically specific social form is not grounded on the base/superstructure scheme. Moreover, it may be pointed out in passing that, in continuing this view, Marx added and argued that “in the aboriginal and undeveloped conditions on which this social relation of production and the mode of production corresponding to it are based, tradition must play a predominant role” (ibid, p.921). He continues to suggest that “here as always” it is in the interest of the dominant section of society to sanctify the existing situation as law and to fix the limits given by custom and tradition as legal system. The constant reproduction of the existing situation and relationship in a regular form which itself is an indispensable moment of any mode of production, and the form of the surplus labor, in the course of

time is reinforced as “usage” and “tradition” and finally sanctified as an explicit law (ibid). Given these complex and dynamic conceptualization of a form of social life, Marx’s theorization is not confined to the rigid base/superstructure metaphor, or the celebrated forces/relations of production “model” which has been conceptualized by commentators of Marx. Maurice Godelier, the well-known anthropologist has pointed out that the forces of production, or more accurately, the productive powers (German term is *produktivkrafte*) and relations of production, although distinct realities, never exist separately; they are related and combined in a specific manner (Godelier, 1978, p.85). The productive powers includes both the totality of technical procedures (rules for manufacture of tools, rules for use of the body in work, *interalia*) and the “knowledge” of nature, the “intellectual” means of transforming nature. Still there are complex relations between the real living individuals and material reality as well as what Godelier calls, “ideal” realities (ideas, schemas, representations, etc.) (ibid, pp.85-6). On this account, every social relationship is born and exists simultaneously within thought and without it, both as a material and an ideal social-historical reality; in other words, every relation (social practice) contains an ideal part from the outset which is an indispensable aspect and constitutive of it (ibid, p.92).

Consciousness and thought not only interpret social reality actively, but organize all the social practices acting on this social-historical reality. Consciousness thus contributes to the production of new social realities (ibid). According to Marx, consciousness from the very beginning is not just a description or reflex of social life but is itself a social production (Marx, 1976, pp.49-50).

These consideration on the interconnection between productive powers and the social forms of relations of production may also contribute to the historical materialist explanation of the different forms of sociality prior to capitalism, which must be empirically grounded and informed by Marx's critical theory which "does not explain practice from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from material practice" (ibid, p.61). Ideas are material and thought and intellectuality are not a form of life among others in which life and social production articulate and relate themselves externally. Rather they are the unitary power that constitutes the multiple forms of life as form-of-life (Agamben, 1996, p.155). Thought is form of life, a life that can not be dissociated and isolated from its form (ibid). Moreover, several insights can be drawn from Godelier's conclusion which is predicated upon his empirical historical studies of the three different societies, relations of kinship in the case of the hunter-gatherer societies of the Australian aborigines, the religious relation in the case of the ancient Sumerian organization in the Mesopotamian city-states and politics in the case of a Greek city-state (ibid, pp.87-8). This observation and formulation mean that according to Godelier the aforementioned relations serve as relations of production which if they are taken seriously, prevents historical materialists from falling in the idealist, ahistorical and evolutionistic accounts in explanation of the social change and analysis of a determinate mode of production of material life. Against mainstream Marxists and Marxologists, who emphasize one particular text to justify their readings of Marx, and demote him to a crude economic or technological reductionist in praise or discredit, the following passage may be puzzling and stands out as surprise:

Forces of production and social relations--two different sides of the development of the social individual ... Nature builds no machines, no locomotives, railways ... These are

products of human industry; natural material transformed into organs of the human hand; the power of knowledge, objectified. The development of fixed capital indicated to what degree general social knowledge has become a direct force of production, and to what degree, hence, the conditions of the process of social life itself have come under the control of the general social intellect and been transformed in accordance with it. To what degree the powers of social production have been produced, not only in the form of knowledge, but also as immediate organs of social practice, of the real life process (Marx, 1973, p.706)

A recent rereading of Marx by well-known scholar, Terrell Carver in his book The Postmodern Marx (1998) re-invents the wheel by adopting a line of argument similar to technological reductionism in theorization of history and social change; in this respect, re-reading a passage from The German Ideology, he scolds some commentators and writers who like Marx are critical of social division of labor regardless of the state of technology (Carver, 1998, p.100). Marx comes under fire from one of his sympathizers for ignoring the “undeveloped state of technology” in his critique of the social division of labor, as if Marx ascribed pride of place to “technology” in presumed communist society. That said, it is the problems of this kind (treating productive powers and by extension “technology”, “machine”, and “tool”, as things, as neutral, and divorcing them from social-historical practices, that is, from the real life processes, from social division of labor, from the structured social relations of domination) that contributed to the establishing and sustaining relations of domination in the former Soviet-type societies. In this respect, Lenin’s uncritical observation of Taylor’s system [Taylor’s system is based on discipline, management control over the labor process, obedience, compartmentalization of tasks, deepening the division between mental and manual labor, increasing the “repetitiveness and monotony of work”, and so forthamong ;(see excellent book by James W. Rinehart (1987) on the tyranny of Taylor system)] is worth quoting:

The possibility of building socialism depends on our success in combining Soviet power and the Soviet organization of industry with up-to-date achievements of capitalism. We

must organize in Russia the study and teaching of the Taylor system, and systematically try it out and adapt it to our ends (quoted in Cooley, 1978, p.18).

To recap, productive powers are not things but are rather human beings, and their cooperation within the technical and social division of labor (Lichtman, 1975, p.57). Indeed, there is an inner connection (link) between productive powers and social relations of production and between them and other moments (forms) within the mode of production of material life such as signifying (cultural) production, and relational production (relational system), and the institutions associated with them. Having said that, I do not collapse these various types of production into each other analytically or undermine their distinctions or deny their partial autonomy. Rather, I call into question the idea of their total autonomy, the rigid split, the idea of the isolation of these kinds of production from each other, from “society”, from history, couched in mechanical terms, and fails to specify the precise nature of the relationship of the moments of praxis (Swingewood, 1977, pp.62-3).

Additionally, Marx treated “mode of production” in much broader sense than many of his disciples, and in some instances, he equated it with a determinate mode of life. For example, in The German Ideology, Marx pointed out that:

[M]ode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part. As individuals express their life, so they are (Marx, 1976, p.37).

In this passage, the mode of production entails more than just material goods, and the reproduction of physical existence. It also includes human practical activities, a myriad of interrelated forms of social practice. Equally important is Marx’s emphasis on historical specificity of a determinate form of social life.

Consequently, it can be suggested that a reconstructed theory of Marx abandons entirely the base/superstructure couplet. Instead it emphasizes the elaboration and reworking of Marx's theory of praxis, and by extension, a determinate mode of production of material life; this reformulation and reconstruction clears up the confusion between the components of a definite praxis, and the components of a determinate form of social life, while denying the "chaotic" conception of a whole, argues for a "rich totality of many determinations and relations", as continuous forms with varying degrees of distance, and partial autonomy.

I do not intend to undertake an exhaustive review of the literature on the relationship between ideology and critique in general. My concern rather, is to show that the analysis of the ideology of commodity fetishism must be connected to the question of critique. In commodity production, abstract labor (alienated labor) acquires an autonomy, an autonomous existence vis-à-vis the agents of production, and present itself to them as natural law, governing them regardless of their wills in the form that world market and its conjunctures prevail on them as blind necessity (Marx, 1991, pp.969-70). Thus, with great understanding, Marx reveals the intrinsic unity between the theory of value and theory of fetishism (alienation); abstract labor is alienated labor which has separated (estranged and objectified) from the agents of production, from real living individuals, and has become commodities, thereby, a part of capital. Capital, according to Marx's treatment of it, is an independent social force, acquired its own autonomous existence, has become "the power of a portion of society" over the rest, a power that "by means of its exchange for direct, living labour power" maintained and multiplying itself (Colletti, 1972, pp.87-8). Put it in slightly different term, political economy (bourgeois economics)

is nothing else but bourgeois ideology since the discursive order of bourgeois ideology is nothing else but the expression of commodity fetishism; bourgeois ideology arises from the abstractions made in alienated labor (Ollman, 1980, p.233).

IV. The Status of Ideology Within a Form of Social Life

Drawing on Valamanesh's insights, this thesis proposes that ideology is composed of two pivots (bases) or axes on which ideology centers (turns): the system of ideological institutions, and the system of beliefs of the interpelees.

Figure 1:Two Axes or Cores of Ideology

1. The system of ideological institutions (apparatuses)

2. The system of beliefs of the interpelees or addressees

The system of ideological apparatuses is composed of :

a) symbol-systems

b) the system of embodied institutions

The symbols (signs) are of two kinds:

I discursive signs

II non-discursive signs

Source: Valamanesh, 1988, p.219

Ideology is composed of two components: objective and subjective. The order (system) of ideological apparatuses is the objective component of ideology whereas the order (system) of the beliefs of the interpellated of ideology is the subjective component. The embodied institutions of ideology exist in a range of institutions such as the mosque, the church, the synagogue, the political parties, among others, as Poulantzas has observed. However, I argue that, to place these institutions within states, or include them as part of states, as Poulantzas following Althusser, claimed, is untenable (Poulantzas, 1976, pp.250-1; Miliband, 1976, pp.261-2; Therborn, 1988, p.85).

As Therborn has observed, the ideological apparatuses are part and parcel of the organization of power in class societies, and the social power relations are concentrated and consolidated within state (ibid, p.85). Therborn's reformulation is in a way a corrective to Althusser and Poulantzas thesis. One significant point that this reformulation raises is to differentiate between state power and class power analytically and which avoids their collapse into each other. In this context, as Thomas argues, it is important to note that the power that ruling class exercises is much more general and all-encompassing than the state power (Thomas, 1984, pp.118-9). However, I will argue that the social power, the class power and state power do not exist entirely independent from one another. Also, the so-called "national" state is a form, an instance of global structures, relations and practices of power (Picciotto, 1991, p.61; Holloway, 1995, pp.119-29); indeed, the network of international bodies and organizations, the intergovernmental bodies, and their ideological functions have played an important part

in production and reproduction of capital, of capital-in-general and of particular capitals, the global structured social relations of power (Picciotto, 1991, p.53).

Having raised these important points the discursive system of signs and non-discursive symbolic systems are two objective components of ideology, which include rituals , anthems, set of rules (codes), abstract concepts, the political speeches, etc, and the totems, photographic images, an object, the dances, colors, a trade mark, the music, the sign of the cross, etc. respectively. The relation between the three components of ideology, that is, the system of embodied institutions (apparatuses), the symbolic systems (discursive and non-discursive) and the belief systems of the interpellées, has created profound confusion and misunderstanding about ideology. My reading, thus, runs contrary to popular view, which regards ideology mainly as the system of belief (ideology does not need to be about what individuals think) and fails to appreciate and acknowledge the principal axis and the central characteristic of ideology, i.e., the embodied institutions (apparatuses). It is important to emphasize that the configured and embodied institutions constantly generate the system signs and the former invites the interpellées to accept the latter (for instance, a specific type of social identity). However, the acceptance of the interpellation does not automatically, spontaneously, and teleologically results in subjection, or in reproduction of the signs, unless the interpellées articulate them in speech (speech act is performed) and in action. They thereby help to secure the existence and the actuality of the embodied institutions of ideology (Valamanesh, p.221). An example of such operation is value and its mode of operation in the capitalist mode of production. Value as the objective embodiment of abstract human labor (the embodiment of an abstraction) is the determinant of the relations in the

capitalist mode of production. Commodity as value is a social objectivity itself. The analysis of value form as an objectified abstraction has been already demonstrated which is identical in operation with ideology and its objective components. This line of argument was registered by Habermas when he wrote that “[i]n Marx, therefore, theoretical analysis of the value form has the double task of uncovering both the steering principle of commerce in a market economy and the basic ideology of bourgeois class society. The theory of value serves, at the same time, the functional analysis of the economic system and the critique of ideology of a class domination that can be unmasked ... that in the labor market equivalents are not exchanged” (Habermas, 1976, p.26; Valamanesh, 1988, p.222). What this implies and signifies, can be stated, in Valamanesh’s terms, that the ideological relation between institutions of ideology and the interpelees (the internal relations between the three components of ideology) is constructed and performed when the objective institutions present themselves to the interpelees (in their belief system) as their consciousness (ibid, p.227).

1. The Mechanism of Ideological Subjection-Qualification

In his book, The Ideology of Power and the Power of Ideology, Goran Therborn (1988) has made an impressive contribution to the study of ideology. A key element of his theory is that “the dialectical character of ideology,” is “a dialect indicated by the two opposite senses of the word ‘subject’ (‘the subjects of history’/‘the subjects of the prince’). Ideologies not only subject people to a given order. They also qualify them for conscious social action, including actions of gradual or revolutionary change. Ideologies

do not function merely as ‘social cement’” (Therborn, 1988, p.vii). What Therborn calls “the debate process of subjection and qualification” (ibid, p.18) is useful (if amended) for understanding the relation between the institutions of ideology with the interpellates of ideology. In this context, it is important to clarify that the term subject, for Therborn, involves two senses: subject as for example, the subject of a particular king or a given social order, and subject as the subjects of the history”, the former involves those who are subjugated under a particular order or force, the latter refers to the “makers or creators of something” (ibid, pp.16-7). Thus, for instance, an enthusiastic fascist (who characterizes her/himself as an adherent of a particular ideology, by articulating his/her adherence and sympathy) both sustains the discursive and non-discursive institutions (via repetition) and promotes them. His/her practices have not only helped form and shape the signifying institutions but also he/she retains and consolidates the embodied (objectified) institutions of ideology: s/he qualifies him/herself to hold those beliefs, and, at the same time, s/he is subjected to them (Valamanesh, 1988, pp.225-6). Furthermore, Therborn has argued that the “basic social functioning” of objection-qualification involves “three fundamental modes of ideological interpellation. Ideologies subject and qualify subjects by telling them, relating them to, and making them recognize: 1. What exists, and its corollary, what does not exist ... who we are, what the world is ... a sense of identity ... 2. What is good, right, just, ... and its opposites. 3. What is possible and impossible; our sense of the mutability of our being-in-the-world ...” (Therborn, 1988, p.18). While Therborn provides insights about the materiality and historicity of ideology as well as the double process of subjection and qualification, nevertheless, it needs to be said that his theorizing on ideology is problematic in some respects. I can not go into details here,

however, suffice to say that his rejection of the concept of interest (ibid, p.5 and p.10) jeopardizes his contribution to the theoretical exploration on the concept of ideology. In my view, the theory of ideology must be connected to sectional interests since ideology as domination conceals the sectional interests. The concept of ideology and the analysis of ideology is connected with the question of critique, i.e., to the critique of ideology, or critique of domination. Also, there is a problem in his claim that, “Not all ideology is or can operate as science, art, philosophy, or law, but all these emerge out of ideological configurations and may function as ideologies” (ibid, p.2). He is right when he points to the ideological aspects or ideological use of symbol-systems such as science, art, and philosophy; the latter may become ideological in particular social-historical conjunctures, that is, in class societies. However, his argument about law does not hold up. Law is an abstract expression of social relations and ideology as domination is intrinsic to it. Furthermore, his observation on the “formation of humans by every ideology ... involves a process simultaneously of subjection and of qualification. The amorphous libido and manifold potentialities of human infants are subjected to a particular order that allows or favours certain drives and capacities, and prohibits or disfavors others. At the same time, through the same process, new members become qualified to take up and perform (a particular part of) the repertoire of roles given in the society into which they are born, including the role of possible agents of social change” (ibid, p.17) remains entrapped in a form of functionalism that reduces the real living individuals, the determinate socially and historically located individuals, the executors of practice, to the dupes, to the passive “supports”, to the raw materials, malleable and transformable into “subjects” by ideology,

and doomed to their immutable role and “pre-determined destiny” (Callinicos, 1987, pp.128-9, and p.155). Thus, Althusser and, in some respects, Therborn offers a model of interpellation that is unable to account for social change and transformation.

2. Praxis

Let us examine more closely the place of praxis, the *specifia differentia* of Marx’s theory. Of various theorists who shed some light on the conceptions of praxis. Petrovic and Althusser are relevant for present purposes of this paper. Drawing on Marx, Petrovic rejects the traditional definition of real living individuals (or “man” a sexist term) as a rational animal, who is distinguished from animals by the virtue of the conscious life activity (Petrovic, 1967, p.78). Instead he suggests that one must interpret praxis as “a universal-creative self-creative activity, activity by which man transforms and creates his world and himself. Exactly such an interpretation prevails in Marx” (ibid, pp.78-9). He goes on and quotes a passage from Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts for reconstructing the theory of praxis and by extension historical materialism as follows:

Animals construct only in accordance with the standards and needs of the species to which they belong, while man knows how to produce in accordance with the standards of every species and knows how to apply the appropriate standard to the object. Thus man constructs also in accordance with the laws of beauty” (ibid, p.79).

Since a real living individual is praxis and history, s/he is also the future. Also, on the grounds that individuals’ universal-creative and self-creative activity, with all their peculiarities, is constant in the history, they transform and create the world and

themselves; therefore, the all-round development of the individual never comes into fruition, never completed and never defined (ibid, p.80).

Petrovic's contribution and intervention is not without some difficulty. Suffice to note in passing that Petrovic's general formulation does not account for the "many determinations of a rich totality". With this in view, a couple of questions arise: what are the elements of praxis itself? How the relations between these components (elements) and with the social institutions which mediate these elements, is articulated and related in a determinate mode of production of material life? Regretably, Petrovic does not examine the relations between internal components (elements) of praxis.

Another key theorist who put forward important and original insights to clarify practice is Louis Althusser. Drawing on Marx's explanation of the human labor process in Chapter 7 of Capital I, Althusser wrote:

By practice in general I shall mean any process of transformation of a determinate given raw material into a determinate product, a transformation effected by a determinate human labour, using determinate means (of 'production'). In any practice thus conceived, the determinate moment (or element) is neither the raw material nor the product, but the practice in the narrow sense: the moment of the labour of transformation itself, which sets to work, in a specific structure, men means and a technical method of utilizing the means (Althusser, 1969, pp.166-7).

On Althusser's view, there are different practices constitutive of a determinate social form, irreducible to each other, relatively autonomous yet, they are based on a certain type of articulation in the complex social totality and therefore on a certain type of dependence with respect to the social totality in a determinate "society" (Althusser, 1969, p.167; Althusser and Balibar, 1970, pp.99-100). On his account, there are a number of practices existing in a determinate "society" such as "economic" production, political

practice, ideological practice as well as theoretical practice (Althusser, 1969, p.167). His account of the complex whole, his rejection of Hegelian expressive totality, original essence and homogenous temporality, and his emphasis on the idea of the over-determination of contradiction opened up insightful debates within the “Marxist” tradition. Having said that, I wish to submit Althusser to some critical comments without going into details of his version of Marxism-Leninism. Against Althusser’s dialectical materialism (Althusser and Balibar 1970, pp.129-30; 1976, p.98) (dialectical materialism originated from Engels, in particular, elaborated by Plekhanov), I will, however, very briefly argue that Marx’s materialism is not at all philosophical materialism. Marx’s standpoint is distinctive from humanism and naturalism or any philosophical materialism; in other word, his standpoint is not abstract, atomized, isolated, ahistorical human beings, rather, it is socially and historically located practices of concrete real living individuals who actively transform social-historical world and themselves. A brief glance over Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach reveals that Marx submits “all materialism up till now” to critique. In other words, critique is aimed at traditional philosophy, or more accurately, at any philosophical materialism, including dialectical materialism. Marx does not endorse scholastic debate, the so-called materialism/idealism distinction when wrote:

The chief deficiency of all materialism up till now (Feuerbach included) is that objectivity, reality, the sensible world is conceived only in the form of the object or of observation; not however as sensible human activity, practice, not from the aspect of the subject ... Hence he does not grasp the meaning of ‘revolutionary’, of ‘practical-critical’ activity”

Also, according to Marx, philosophy will lose its medium of existence as an independent branch of knowledge, where real life starts and the only task left for philosophy is elaborating and summing-up the most general results of the sciences (Marx and Engels,

1976, p.43; Marcuse, 1969, pp.155-6; Edgley, 1983, pp.246-5; Ruben, 1977, p.103); before all, as even Engels asserted, Marx was a revolutionary: Marx was a practical materialist and the actual thrust of his work was towards the revolutionary transformation of capitalist social relations and abolish of the social division of labor, consequently, his critique of political economy was seen as a contribution to that process (Carver, 1983, p.154). Perhaps this explains why one cannot find a philosophical system in Marx's work: Balibar phrase it brilliantly that "there is no Marxist philosophy and there never will be", nonetheless, Marx is "more important for philosophy than ever before" (Balibar, 1995, p.1).

Another problem involved in Althusser's conceptualization of a determinate social form in terms of practices is that he accorded a pride of place to "the economy" ("determination in the last instance") (Althusser, 1969, pp.213-15) which in return undermined his contribution, namely, the idea of the over-determination of contradiction. Therefore, he fell back on the so-called "economic" reductionism which he himself helped to challenge and displace (Hennessey, 1993, pp.29-30) makes a parallel argument).

It must also be noted that "determination in the last instance by the economy" suggested by Althusser overlooks that there exist not rigid distinction between different spheres of production in a determinate mode of production of material life, and underestimates that the always already, in different forms, existing political nature and coercive political force in the constitution and reproduction of the social relations of production (Ryan, 1982, p.82; Poulantzas, 1978, p.17). In a historically determinate mode of production of material life (or a form of social life), the relations between different

spheres are not external to each other, rather all elements and spheres of production (the concrete forms of practices) are inextricably linked and articulated (interrelated and interconnected) in a complex hierarchical relationship. In this respect, I wish to propose that the base/superstructure metaphor must be discarded once and for all. Furthermore, it is important to stress that Marx very rarely employed the concept of “the economy”, suggested by Althusser. In a footnote in Capital I, Marx reminds us that “The writers of history have so far paid very little attention to the development of material production, which is the basis of all social life, and therefore of all real history” (Marx, 1990, p.286). It is sufficient to focus briefly on the category of “material production”. On Marx’s view, production is an activity, human practical activity, and implies not only production of material goods but also the production of human beings themselves (the propagation of the species). Production is inextricably bound up with human labor and human social relations and the historically specific forms assumed by the latter. The process of production can not be divorced, separated, and disentangled from the process of reproduction and must be seen as the two interrelated moments of the process of the social production. In Grundrisse, for instance, Marx has remarked that:

Not only do the objective conditions change in the act of reproduction, e.g. the village becomes a town ... but the producers change, too, in that they bring out new qualities in themselves, develop themselves in production, transform themselves, develop new powers and ideas, new modes of intercourse, new needs and new language (Marx, 1973, p.494).

Thus, production involves human practical activity, consciousness, ideas, knowledge, thought, skills, among others: it is a dynamic process inseparable from reproduction and the ways in which social reproduction is organized. Moreover, production and

reproduction involves both transformation of circumstances and selves which is grounded in social-historical world, in times and spaces.

Determination in the last instance by the economy, on the contrary, implies that there is “out there” an “iron law”, an “objective economic law” beyond human control. Also Althusser’s standpoint is quite divergent from Marx, since the former brings together different moments of a historically definite form of social life into a haphazard (external and exogenous) relation with one another, which is the imprint of pluralist functionalism and positivism. Moreover, the rigid separation that Althusser sanctions between so-called “the political” and “the economic”, he relegates implicitly the sexual production, the procreative praxis, to the subordinate place, which is, a trace, a residual of male-domination (patriarchal) ideology (Ryan, 1982, pp.98-101) and institutions associated with it.

Perhaps it is appropriate at this point to clarify various instances and aspects of a determinate praxis and a determinate mode of production of material life, or a form of social life. Recognizing the problems posed by base-superstructure metaphor, and Engel’s failure to correct it by mutual interaction, i.e. two-way interactions (reciprocity), Karl Korsh aptly pointed out that:

The entire problem disappears just as soon as we substitute for the general question of the effect of ‘economics as such’, upon ‘politics as such’, or ‘law, art and culture as such’, and vice versa, a detailed description of the definite relations which exist between definite economic phenomena on a definite historical level of development and definite phenomena which appear simultaneously or subsequently in every other field of political, juristic and intellectual development (Korsch, 1972, pp.64-5).

Contrary to Althusser and Poulantzas who formulated a regional theory based on abstract and formal relations between “regions” in functional terms (a Marxified form of

Parsonian structural functionalism) there exists a process of interconnection and interrelation between different elements and spheres of social practice in a historically determinate mode of production of material life, or a definite form of social life. This means that, although each sphere, instance (moment) of social practice enjoys a certain, a partial autonomy, and each is not reducible to each other, or to some essence, center, origin, and telos and there is a complex and hierarchical relation between each instance in a historically and socially grounded form of social life, yet the interrelations between each productive sphere must not be perceived in a functionalist manner characterized by the concept of “articulation” of parts of a “system ” (systems theory) in which real living individuals with flesh and blood are reduced to mere “support” and passive, and the “system” plays an active part like Muhammad’s God or Hobbes’ Leviathan (see excellent essays by Johnson 1982).

Working to resolve the problems posed by the base/superstructure scheme, Valamanesh has remarked that a praxis must be understood as an objective object or objective social-historical reality which embodies three objective moments: act (action), relation, and sign (symbol). Each praxis, for instance, a definite productive praxis or a definite procreative praxis, always embodies three moments (instances) simultaneously, inseparable from one another (Valamanesh, 1988, pp.277-8). The conflation and confusion over these three objective moments have given rise to the base-superstructure dichotomy, and giving the former determining force (the so-called “economic” reductionism), has precluded a sound conceptualization of the cultural forms of social life, non-class struggles, the processes of reproduction (as a part of social life and the form of social life, see excellent analysis of reproduction by Hearn, 1987, pp.57-101),

sexuality, ideology (in particular, the most subtle forms of ideology in everyday life), among others. In base-superstructure model, the status of ideology is also problematic, and it has contributed to the misidentification of the very concept of ideology with consciousness. To go beyond this problematic, requires the entire rejection of the base-superstructure metaphor. This means to conceptualize a definite praxis as embodying simultaneously three interrelated, interconnected, and articulated (the concept of articulation can be retained if it is purged and stripped of any imprint of functionalism, structuralism, and economism) forms. However, it is possible to separate the three moments from one another to account for the analysis of their relationship with each other only on the levels of abstraction. Or put it differently, one is capable to account for and think of a moment of a definite praxis, namely, act (for instance, production), separate (distinct) from relation (for instance, class struggle), and sign (for instance, art) analytically, and on the level of abstraction (Valamanesh, pp.280-2). Thus, two aspects or forms of a definite mode of production of material life (a definite form of social life), that is, class struggle and an interrelated combination of productive powers and relations of production, are not two “motors” of social change-which their relation couched in mechanical terms is based on an evolutionary scheme of history, and either of them playing the “determining” role (the worn out dichotomy of objectivism/voluntarism), as the Second and Third International theorists and the mainstream Marxists has claimed-separate (distinct) from each other, with no option but to choose one of the term. Rather they are two objective moments of the historically and socially located practices of the real living individuals within a definite form of social life (articulated totality). Also, I contend that there is no contradiction between the relations of production and the

productive powers couplet argued by Marx (in the 1859 Preface) and many Marxists. It seems to me that it is reasonable (on the historical and empirical studies) to argue that the disjuncture between couplet may be verified only with the “emergence” of capitalism. For instance, it is highly problematic to argue for the disjuncture between the couplet in the “Mesopotamian city-states”. In this respect, Godelier’s observation is historically and empirically valid when he contends that it is only with the advent of capitalism, “in the reality of the capitalist mode of production, which for the first time separated economics, politics, religion, kinship, art, etc., as so many distinct institutions’ came into existence (Godelier, 1978, p.88).

Having said that, although a form of material production is simultaneously interrelated and interconnected (articulated) with a form of social relation (class struggle) and a form of symbols-system (signifying production), in a definite form of social life, yet the relation between these spheres of production is complex, hierarchical, and uneven (there is no so-called one-to-one “correspondence” between these forms unless in the span and across a range of history and not in each conjuncture). This problem is Achilles’ heel of Marxism. In this respect, it is hardly surprising that most Marxists and neo-Marxists were and are at pains to provide us with any adequate theoretical rigor as to why some ideologies (for instance, religion such as Islam and Zoroastrianism), traditions, among others, which came into existence prior to capitalism, still survive (some forms vanished) when the historically determinate form of social life which gave rise to them, has been either displaced or radically transformed. The economic reductionist, the productive “force” reductionist Marxism and even the neo-Marxists can not account for the persistence of Zoroastrianism and Islam, for instance, in contemporary Iran, while the

conditions of existence and the social relations which gave rise to these religions no longer exists or have been effectively changed and transformed.

The elements of the signifying production do not just “survive” as the “residual”, as the “remnants” of society in transition; these forms are not simply a matter of the “Feudal”, “Asiatic” remnants persisting along side of the capitalist forms (Taylor, 1974, p.22; Hoston, 1986, p.247) as suggested by some Marxists and non-Marxists. The elements of the signifying production enjoy a certain, a partial autonomy, each has “a different object and practice”, therefore, “they can continue to be reproduced as formerly” even when the definite form of social life which gave rise to them displaced (Taylor, p.22). Taylor has observed that the ideology of kinship continues to be reproduced in some African countries even when capitalist social relations transformed the former social relations (ibid). Basing on the Introduction to Agrarian Problem (written by a Japanese Marxist, Inomata), Germaine A. Hoston makes a parallel argument about the persistence of “more numerous” remnants of “feudalism” in Japan despite the changes brought about by capitalism in interwar Japan (Hoston, 1986, pp.245-7).

Equally important is the relationship between art and other spheres of production, that is, the relationship between art and material production and other social forms and practices. For Marx, then, the relationship is unequal and uneven: “The uneven development of material production relative to e.g. artistic development” (Marx, 1973, p.109). He goes on to add that:

In the case of the arts, it is well known that certain periods of their flowering are out of all proportion to the general development of society, hence also to the material foundation, the skeletal structure as it were, of its organization ... It is even recognized that certain forms of art, e.g. the epic, can no longer be produced in their world epoch-making,

classical stature as soon as the production of art, as such, begins; that is, that certain significant forms within the realm of the arts are possible only at an undeveloped stage of artistic development. If this is the case with the relation between different kinds of art within the realm of the arts, it is already less puzzling that it is the case in the relation of the entire realm to the general development of society. The difficulty consists only in the general formulation of these contradictions. As soon as they have been specified, they are already clarified (ibid. p.110).

For Marx, art enjoys a certain, a partial autonomy in relation to other spheres and social-historical practices. The difficulty, for Marx, lies somewhere else, that is to say, the Greek arts and epic, for instance, while they were bound up with particular forms of social relation and practices which already vanished, their enduring values afford us aesthetic pleasure and they count a certain respect as a norm and as an unattainable model in the present (ibid. p.111). It is beyond the scope of this paper and I cannot afford to delve into the relation between art and ideology, however, it is suffice to argue that art enjoys a “partial autonomy” vis-à-vis ideology and other forms of practices in a determinate form of social life. This theme was raised by Marx and it is evident in his observation on Greek mythology which is both arsenal and the foundation of Greek art (ibid, p.110), and the certain periods of the highest development of art stand in no direct connection with the general development of society and the conditions of existence; in other words, there is no one-to-one “correspondence” (connection) between art, cultural forms and material production and other forms of practice, rather there subsists a complex hierarchical, uneven and subtle interrelation and entwinement between various forms of production within specific historical mode of production of material life. Art is socially conditioned, but – enjoys a certain autonomy, it may become ideological, but it is not ideology per se. Art is not a form of praxis in which the social-historical world is directly reflected and social reality is copied and imitated, rather aesthetic creation always mediated through the structures of consciousness, social-historical reality is


interpreted and through the interpretation social reality itself is changed (Aronowitz, 1981, p.256; Swingewood, 1986, p.33).

In examining the distinction between art and ideology, it is of importance to identify domination as the distinguishing trait of ideology, whereas the denial of the relations of domination is the distinguishing trait of art. However, a distinction must be drawn between ideology in the cast (costume) of art and the ideological functioning of art; a work of art, for instance, a poem, may be used in a left political journal, though, this ideological function does not by itself render the poem to ideology. Another distinction between art and ideology is that, in a specific form of social life, not on the level of abstraction, art is situated within the symbolic systems whereas ideology is located in the interstices between symbol-systems and class struggle (relational system) (Valamanesh, 1988, pp.302-4). As a result, art enjoys both a partial autonomy vis-à-vis ideology and other structures (forms of production and practice).

At this point, let us closely look at the status of ideology to other spheres and practices. Echoing Althusser, Valamanesh analyzes the varying degrees of distance and autonomy of ideology from other elements and components of practice. Ideology, he noted, is an objective moment (material practice), which subsists in the articulation of the class struggle. It follows that, production, class struggle, and the symbol-systems correspond to the three aforementioned components of praxis and the three practices are conceptualized as the interconnected spheres which make up the production and reproduction of conditions of existence on the level of abstraction in the broadest sense: material production, relational production, and signifying production (Hennessy, 1993, p.30, makes parallel argument). However, on the concrete level, a mode of production of

material life (a determinate form of social life) must be conceptualized as an ensemble of interrelated (articulated) forms (practices) and elements:

Figure 2: Interrelated Forms and Elements of a Determinate Form of Social Life



At this point, it is important to note that there exist the highly complex and unequal relationship between and within the elements of a determinate mode of production of material life; in other words, the relationship between spheres of production is uneven and each sphere stands in articulation with and simultaneously with varying degrees of distance from other spheres of a definite mode of life (a determinate form of social life). For instance, the social relations of production is a part of the sphere

of material production so far as it is concerned with the place of human beings within the production spheres. On the other hand, it is a part of the relational sphere and class struggle when it is involved with the mode of relations of human beings with each other. As a result, it is solely on the most general level of abstraction that is possible to situate the social relations of production within the sphere of material production, while divorced from the mode of relational system. This is the reason that the social relations of production is situated in the interstices of the two spheres of production. This is also true for ideology. Ideology is situated in the interstices of the spheres of class struggle and the signifying production; it is located in the sphere of class struggle (social relations) so far as it is determinant of the relation as an objectified abstraction, and so far as crystallizes itself as a system of signs, it belongs to the symbolic-systems (ibid, pp.288-9). This kind of analysis allows us to acknowledge the specificities of forms of practices, their partial autonomy without denying the simultaneous entwinement and interrelation of these elements and spheres within a complex, uneven, and hierarchical social “totality”. This approach also allows the researcher to explore and investigate the persistence of the older ideologies and traditions, and their associated institutions (such as patriarchal family forms) and the emergence of new forms at this particular historical moment in particular forms of social life (such as Islamism in the so-called “Middle East”). Furthermore, analysis of this sort, is essential for understanding the global uneven relations, the global social division of labor, the global multiple struggles, the global social contradictions (such as principal and secondary contradictions at different times and places), the global multi-layered times (temporal non-synchrony) in an entangled social-historical world. Understanding and acknowledging the partial autonomy of the elements of a historically

determinate mode of production of material life in relation to each other from top to down, that is to say, the more partial (a certain) autonomy of the last element, that is, the symbol-systems vis-à-vis the class struggle to the second last element, namely, ideology (to a much lesser extent partial autonomy) vis-à-vis the class struggle allows us to investigate more accurately not only the present social-historical world, which is imbricated with global capital, but the past, the different modes of production of material life, and the persistence of some of their elements in the contemporary social-historical world. For example, mathematics has been around for a long time, at different times and places, and has “corresponded” with various modes of material production, social relations of production, and class struggle (social relations), but it has out-survived, and it continues to be reproduced as formerly, even when the latter forms and elements of social practice have been displaced; in other words, mathematics (or art, for instance) both has enjoyed partial autonomy and has continued to be reproduced as formerly along the different spheres of production in different modes of production of material life (for instance, feudalism and capitalism) (ibid, p.289). This kind of analysis is, again, essential for conceptualization of partial autonomy of state on the one hand, and the simultaneous interrelation and partial autonomy of ideology in relation to state on the other hand.

V. Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that ideology plays an important part in sustaining and reproducing the relations of domination. To develop a critical conception of ideology adequate to the contemporary social-historical world, which is highly complex, uneven, hierarchical and relationally and socially contradictory and temporally non-convergent or partially convergent, is a pressing task. However, a reworked, reformulated and elaborated critical conception of ideology must draw on Marx's critical conception of ideology, and his critique of political economy as critique of ideology. Marx connected the explanation of ideology to the question of critique, namely, critique of domination. In other words, in so far as Marx's scattered and undeveloped remarks are concerned, he broke with the tradition that conceptualized ideology as worldview, as a body of ideas or thought, as system of beliefs, conceptual system, false consciousness, and so on by viewing ideology as an ensemble of embodied (objectified) abstractions, locating it in the social-historical context, in the class societies, in the exploitative structured social relations, and under capitalism in the commodity fetishism, while ascribing to it the partial autonomy from the social relations of production. Ideology conceals the social contradictions, in particular, the principal contradiction between capital and labor under capitalism, reifies (naturalizes) the historically determinate mode of production of material life, and universalizes the sectional interests, among others, therefore, it prevents real living individuals to grasp consciousness and recognition of the conditions of existence. In this respect, Marx emphasized on ideology of commodity fetishism, the ideology that is ingrained and constituted in the social relations of the human beings within capitalist mode of production and present itself in the mind of the agents of

production as it were their consciousness to the social relations. This means that Marx linked and tied the generation and reproduction of ideology to the social contradictions, to the historically specific forms of relations of domination and struggle, the class struggle which paves the way for overcoming ideology itself. This is why, for Marx, critique of political economy which operates as ideology, i.e., denies class contradiction and naturalizes and eternalizes a historically specific form of social life-for Marx, is critical social science, since critique not only shows up contradictions as existing, it explains them and comprehends their genesis and necessity (Marx).

In addition, I have argued that social contradictions as well as the structure of the ideological system as Therborn spelled out are always over-determined by the class contradiction and class struggle, which in turn, is a process of transformation of social structures and practices. Having said that, I have also argued that ideology must be understood as social-historical and material reality embodied and objectified in the system of ideological apparatuses which interpellate individuals in class societies. In this respect, I have explored that each sphere of production enjoys a partial autonomy and the relation of ideology with these forms are complex and shifting since the relations of domination are intrinsically antagonistic. Furthermore, this thesis has argued that ideology interacts, overlaps, clashes, combats, competes, and absorbs each other since a system of exploitation and domination is a relational phenomenon.

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